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I. INTRODUCTION
America was built on family farms, and in the last several decades
many states have moved to protect those farms. All fifty states have a
right-to-farm act of some sort that protects the right of citizens to farm
their land. Recently, some states have gone further and added right-tofarm amendments to their state constitutions. As shown in Schultz Family
Farms LLC v. Jackson Cty., right-to-farm acts allow states to make
exceptions where necessary. Because right-to-farm amendments are so
new, it is too soon to tell exactly what effect they will have. However,
based on the effects of other constitutional amendments, it is likely that it
will prove much harder for states to add necessary exceptions to right-tofarm amendments.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
The Schultz Family Farms LLC, James Frink and Marilyn Frink,
and Frink Family Trust (collectively “Plaintiffs”) are Jackson County
commercial farmers who grow and have currently planted Roundup

2

ReadyTM Alfalfa grown from genetically engineered seeds.1 Plaintiffs are
challenging Proposed Jackson County Ordinance 635 (hereinafter “the
Ordinance” or “Ordinance 635”), which would ban the growth of
genetically engineered crops Jackson County, Oregon.2 The Ordinance
was passed as a ballot measure by Jackson County voters on May 20,
2014, and was intended to go into effect on June 1, 2015.3
Plaintiffs alleged that Ordinance 635 conflicts with Oregon's Right
to Farm Act (“the Act”) and would force them to destroy already-planted
crops without just compensation.4 They sought injunctive and declaratory
relief to “permanently enjoin enforcement of the ordinance,” or, in the
alternative, damages for the ordinance's forced destruction of their crops.5
Defendant alleges that Ordinance 635 is in compliance with the Act and
meets an exception under Senate Bill 863.6
The Act provides that “[a]ny local government . . . ordinance . . .
that makes a farm practice a nuisance or trespass...is invalid with respect
Schultz Family Farms LLC v. Jackson Cty. (hereafter “Schultz”), No. 1:14-CV-01975,
2015 WL 3448069, at *1 (D. Or. May 29, 2015).
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.; see also OR. REV. STAT. §§ 30.930-947 (2015).
5
Schultz, 2015 WL 3448069, at *1.
6
Id.
1

3

to that farm practice.”7 A farm practice includes modes of operation used
on farms of a similar nature and generally accepted, reasonable, or prudent
methods by which a farm can make a profit.8 A nuisance or trespass
includes actions based on “noise, vibration, odors, smoke, dust, mist from
irrigation, use of pesticides and use of crop production substances.”9
The text and context of Oregon's Right to Farm Act show that the
legislature meant to protect farms and farming practices from urban
encroachment.10 The Act contains an exception allowing claims or
ordinances “based on farming practices that cause 'damage to commercial
agricultur[e].'”11 The Act prevents urban and suburban interference with
farming, but still allows commercial farmers recourse in the form of suit
when their crops are being damaged by other farmers.12
Jackson County Ordinance 635 makes it illegal “'for any person or
entity to propagate, cultivate, raise, or grow genetically engineered plants
within Jackson County.'”13 Genetic engineering means any “'modification
Id. at *3; see also OR. REV. STAT. § 30.935 (2015).
Schultz, 2015 WL 3448069, at *3; see also OR. REV. STAT. § 30.930(2) (2015).
9
Id. (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 30.932 (2015)).
10
Id. at *4.
11
Id. (quoting OR. REV. STAT. §§ 30.936(2)(a), 30.937(2)(a) (2015)).
12
Id.
13
Id. (quoting JACKSON CTY., OR., CODE § 635.04).
7
8
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of living plants and organisms by genetic engineering, altering or
amending DNA using recombinant DNA technology such as gene
deletion, gene doubling, introducing a foreign gene, or changing the
position of genes, and includes cell fusion.'”14 The purpose of the
Ordinance is “to protect local farmers from 'significant economic harm to
organic farmers and to other farmers who choose to grow non-genetically
engineered crops' that can be caused by 'genetic drift' from [genetically
engineered] crops.”15 Protecting local farmers fits within the commercial
crop damage exception to Oregon’s Right to Farm Act.16
Oregon Senate Bill 863 made it illegal for local governments “'to
inhibit or prevent the production or use of agricultural seed.'”17 However,
the bill contained an exception for local measures “'[p]roposed by
initiative petition and, on or before January 21, 2013, qualified for
placement on the ballot in a county; and... [a]pproved by the electors of
the county at an election held on May 20, 2014.'”18 The legislative history
shows that this exception was created specifically to allow Ordinance
Id. (quoting JACKSON CTY., OR., CODE § 635.03).
Id. (quoting JACKSON CTY., OR., CODE § 635.02(c)).
16
Id. at *5.
17
Id. (quoting Act of 2013, Or. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. 1, 2 (2013)); see also OR. REV.
STAT. § 637.738(2) (2015).
18
Id. (quoting S.B. 863 § 4, 77th Leg. Assemb., 1st Spec. Sess. (Or. 2013)).
14
15
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635.19
The United States District Court for the District of Oregon held
that Jackson County Ordinance 635 is valid under the Right to Farm Act
and specifically authorized by Oregon law.20
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Right-to-Farm Acts: Oregon
Right-to-farm acts such as the one at issue in Schultz are not new.21
All fifty states have enacted some form of right-to-farm act, and most
right-to-farm acts contain similar provisions.22 These provisions generally

Id. at *6; for more discussion of the legislative history at issue in Schultz, see infra
LEGAL BACKGROUND.
20
Id.
21
Margaret Rosso Grossman & Thomas G. Fischer, Protecting the Right to Farm:
Statutory Limits on Nuisance Actions Against the Farmer, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 95, 119
(1983). One of the first right-to-farm statutes was enacted in North Carolina in 1979. Id.
22
Rusty Rumley, A Comparison of the General Provisions Found in Right-to-Farm
Statutes, 12 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 327, 328-29 (2011); see also ALA. CODE § 6-5-127 (2015);
ALASKA STAT. § 09.45.235 (2015); ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 3-111, 3-112 (2015); ARK.
CODE ANN. §§ 2-4-101-2-4-108 (2015); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3482.5 (2015); COLO. REV.
STAT. §§ 35-3.5-101-35-3.5-103 (2015); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-341 (2015); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 3, § 1401 (2015); FLA. STAT. § 823.14 (2015); GA. CODE ANN. § 41-1-7
(2015); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 165-1-165-6 (2015); IDAHO CODE §§ 22-4501-22-4504
(2015); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/0.01-70/5 (2015); IND. CODE §§ 32-30-6-1-32-30-6-1.5,
32-30-6-9, 32-30-6-11 (2015); IOWA CODE §§ 352.1-352.12 (2015); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§
2-3201-2-3205 (2015); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 413.072 (2015); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
3:3601-3:3624 (2015); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 7 §§ 151-161 (2015); MD. CODE ANN.,
CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-403 (2015); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 243, § 6, ch. 128, § 1A (2015);
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 286.471-286.474 (2015); MINN. STAT. § 561.19 (2015); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 95-3-29 (2015); MO. REV. STAT. § 537.295 (2000); MONT. CODE ANN. §§
27-30-101, 45-8-11 (2015); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 2-4401-2-4404 (2015); NEV. REV. STAT.
19
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include policy statements, definition sections, limits on protected actions,
and prohibitions against local government restrictions, among other
things.23
Schultz is the first Oregon case to address whether local restrictions
on agricultural practices violate the state’s right-to-farm laws.24 Under
Oregon law, courts must look to legislative intent in interpreting a statute,
including pertinent legislative history.25 In deciding Schultz and the fate of
Ordinance 635, the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon looked
primarily to the legislative history surrounding the laws in question:
Oregon’s Right to Farm Act and Senate Bill 863.26

§ 40-140 (2015); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 432:32-432:35 (2015); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§
4:1C-1-4:1C-10.4 (2015); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 47-9-1-47-9-7 (2015); N.Y. AGRIC. &
MKTS. §§ 300-310 (2015); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 106-700-106-701 (2015); N.D. CENT.
CODE §§ 42-04-01-42-04-05 (2015); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 929.01-929.05, 3767.13
(2015); OKLA. STAT. tit. 50, §§ 1-1.1 (2015); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 30.930-30.947 (2015); 3
PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 951-955 (2015); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 2-23-1-2-23-7 (2015); S.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 46-45-10-46-45-80 (2015); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 21-10-25.1-21-1025.6 (2015); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 43-26-101-43-26-104 (2015); TEX. AGRIC. CODE ANN.
§§ 251.001-251.006 (2015); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 17-41-401-17-41-403 (2015); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 5751-5754 (2015); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 3.2-300-3.2-302 (2015);
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 7.48.300-7.48.320 (2015); W. VA. CODE §§ 19-19-1-19-19-6
(2015); WIS. STAT. § 823.08 (2015); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 11-44-101-11-44-103 (2015).
23
Rumley, supra note 22, at 329.
24
Based on the number of citations to OR. REV. STAT. §§ 30.930-30.947 (2015)
(specifically OR. REV. STAT. § 30.935 (2015)).
25
Schultz., 2015 WL 3448069, at *3.
26
Id. at *3-6; for more discussion of the legislative history at issue in Schultz, see infra
INSTANT DECISION.
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Oregon has a long history of protecting its environmental resources
– farmland included.27 The state first codified its agricultural policy in
1973.28 According to Oregon law, the preservation of agricultural land is
important, not just because of agriculture’s role in the state’s economy, but
also because it is a practical way to preserve natural resources.29 “The
preservation of a maximum amount of the limited supply of agricultural
land is necessary to the conservation of the state's economic resources and
the preservation of such land in large blocks is necessary in maintaining
the agricultural economy of the state . . . .”30 The codified policy also
states that protecting agricultural land is “an efficient means of conserving
natural resources that constitute an important physical, social, aesthetic
and economic asset to all of the people of this state.”31 The 1973 policy
statement also sought to protect agricultural land from encroachment by
those who would use it for nonagricultural purposes: “[e]xpansion of
urban development into rural areas is a matter of public concern because
of the unnecessary increases in costs of community services, conflicts
27
Owen J. Furuseth, The Oregon Agricultural Protection Program: A Review and
Assessment, 20 NAT. RESOURCES J. 603, 603 (1980).
28
OR. REV. STAT. § 215.243 (2015).
29
Id.
30
§ 215.243(2).
31
§ 215.243(1).
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between farm and urban activities and the loss of open space and natural
beauty around urban centers occurring as the result of such expansion.”32
The Act was first passed in 1993.33 In part, it echoes the earlier
codification of agricultural policy.34 Among other things, the Act states
that
[f]arming and forest practices are critical to the economic
welfare of this state… [t]he expansion of residential and
urban uses on and near lands zoned or used for agriculture
or production of forest products may give rise to conflicts
between resource and nonresource activities… [f]arming
practices on lands zoned for farm use must be protected…
[p]ersons who locate on or near an area zoned for farm or
forest use must accept the conditions commonly associated
with living in that particular setting.35
Like the 1973 policy codification, the Act protects agricultural land
use and protects agricultural land from complaints by nonagricultural
neighbors.36 Oregon updated the Act in 1995 and again in 2001.37
The Act ultimately prohibits nuisance or trespass claims against
any “farming… practice on lands zoned for farm . . . use . . . .”38 The Act
§ 215.243(3) (emphasis added).
Oregon. Department of Agriculture, Oregon’s Right to Farm Law, (May 2014),
http://www.oregon.gov/ODA/shared/Documents/Publications/NaturalResources/RightTo
Farm.pdf.
34
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 30.930-30.947 (2015).
35
§§ 30.933(1)(a)-(b), (2)(a), (2)(c).
36
§§ 215.243, 30.933, 30.936.
37
Oregon’s Right to Farm Law, supra note 33, at 1.
32
33
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also prohibits nuisance or trespass claims against any “farming . . .
practice allowed as a preexisting nonconforming use . . . .”39 Further, the
Act invalidates “[a]ny local government or special district ordinance or
regulation now in effect or subsequently adopted that makes a farm
practice a nuisance or trespass or provides for its abatement as a nuisance
or trespass . . . .”40 “Nuisance or trespass” includes “claims based on noise,
vibration, odors, smoke, dust, mist from irrigation, use of pesticides and
use of crop production substances.”41 However, there are some narrow
exceptions to these protections.42
The Act defines a “farm” as “any facility, including the land,
buildings, watercourses and appurtenances thereto, used in the commercial
production of crops, nursery stock, livestock, poultry, livestock products,
poultry products, vermiculture products or the propagation and raising of
nursery stock.”43 The Act defines a “farming practice” as
a mode of operation on a farm that… [i]s or may be used
on a farm of a similar nature . . . [i]s a generally accepted,
reasonable and prudent method for the operation of the
OR. REV. STAT. § 30.936(1) (2015).
§ 30.937(1).
40
§ 30.935.
41
§ 30.932.
42
§§ 30.936(2), 30.937(2).
43
§ 30.930(1).
38
39
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farm to obtain a profit in money . . . [i]s or may become a
generally accepted, reasonable and prudent method in
conjunction with farm use . . . [c]omplies with applicable
laws; and . . . [i]s done in a reasonable and prudent
manner.44
The Act also considers “the transport or movement of any
equipment, device or vehicle used in conjunction with a farming practice .
. . on a public road or movement of livestock on a public road” to be a
farming practice.45 Additionally, the Act considers pesticide use to be a
farming practice, so long as the pesticide:
[i]s or may be used on a farm of a similar nature . . . [i]s a
reasonable and prudent method for the operation of the
farm to obtain a profit in money . . . [i]s or may become
customarily utilized in conjunction with farm use . . .
[c]omplies with applicable laws; and . . . [i]s done in a
reasonable and prudent manner.46
As noted above, there are some narrow exceptions to the Act.47
It does not apply to claims for “[d]eath or serious physical injury . .
. .”48 More relevant to Schultz, it does not apply to claims for “[d]amage to
commercial agricultural products.”49

§ 30.930(2).
§ 30.931.
46
§ 30.939(1).
47
§§ 30.936(2), 30.937(2).
48
§§ 30.936(2)(b), 30.937(2)(b).
49
§§ 30.936(2)(a), 30.937(2)(a).
44
45
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Few prior Oregon courts have had reason to interpret the Act.50 In
one case, a court held that the Act’s protection of farming practices
extends to barking dogs.51 The defendant in that case owned a herd of
goats and used the dog in question to guard her livestock.52 One of the
ways in which the dog guarded the livestock was by barking at predators
to scare the predators away or to summon a farmer.53 Because there was
evidence that this was a reasonable farming practice, the court held the
Act applied and the dog’s barking was protected.54 Some states have gone
even further in creating legal protections for farmers and added right-tofarm amendments to their state constitutions.55 However, to date, Oregon
has made no attempt to pass such an amendment.

Based on the number of citations to OR. REV. STAT. §§ 30.930-30.947 (2015). Only six
other cases have referenced the relevant sections of Oregon’s Right to Farm Act; see
Ream v. Keen, 838 P.2d 1073 (Or. 1992); Linn v. Pitts, 858 P.2d 1352 (Or. Ct. App.
1993); Mark v. State Dept. of Fish and Wildlife, 974 P.2d 716 (Or. Ct. App. 1999); Hood
River Cty. v. Mazzara, 89 P.3d 1195 (Or. Ct. App. 2004); Hale v. State, 314 P.3d 345
(Or. Ct. App. 2013); Schoenheit v. Rosenblum, 345 P.3d 436 (Or. 2015).
51
Hood River, 89 P.3d at 1196.
52
Id. at 1197.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 1199.
55
Brandon Kiley, Missouri Voters Pass ‘Right to Farm’ Amendment by Slim Margin,
KBIA, (Aug. 6, 2014), http://kbia.org/post/missouri-voters-pass-right-farm-amendmentslim-margin; see also MO. CONST. art. I, § 35; N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 29.
50
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B. Right-to-Farm Amendments: Missouri and North Dakota
Some states have not been content with right-to-farm acts and have
recently amended their constitutions to protect their respective citizens’
right to farm.56 In 2012, North Dakota was the first state to move beyond
right-to-farm statutes and create a constitutional right to farm.57 Missouri
voters approved a similar constitutional amendment in 2014.58 Both
Indiana and Oklahoma have considered, but not passed, their own right-tofarm amendments.59
North Dakota’s right-to-farm amendment ensures that “[t]he right
of farmers and ranchers to engage in modern farming and ranching
practices shall be forever guaranteed in this state. No law shall be enacted
which abridges the right of farmers and ranchers to employ agricultural

Brooke Jarvis, A Constitutional Right to Industrial Farming?,
BLOOMBERGBUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 9, 2014),
http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-01-09/industrial-farming-stateconstitutional-amendments-may-give-legal-shield.
57
Id.; see also N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 29.
58
Kiley, supra note 55; see also MO. CONST. art. I, § 35.
59
Jarvis, supra note 56; see also S.J. Res. 12, 118th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind.
2015) (right-to-farm amendment ultimately rejected) and H.J. Res. 1012, 55th Leg., 1st
Sess. (Ok. 2015) (right-to-farm amendment passed and awaiting approval or rejection by
a vote of the people of Oklahoma).
56
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technology, modern livestock production, and ranching practices.”60 This
amendment does not include any specific exceptions.61
North Dakota’s earlier right-to-farm act, enacted in 1981,
prevented individuals from bringing nuisance suits against farms
(described in the act as “agricultural operations”) for “any changed
conditions in or about the locality of such operation after it has been in
operation for more than one year, if such operation was not a nuisance at
the time the operation began . . . .”62 The act also contained several
exceptions, including an exception for nuisances “result[ing] from the
negligent or improper operation” of a farm.63 Under North Dakota’s act,
individuals could still bring nuisance suits to “recover damages for any
injury or damage sustained by the person on account of any pollution of or
change in the condition of the waters of any stream or on account of any
overflow of lands of any such person.”64 Like the Oregon right-to-farm act
at issue in Schultz, the North Dakota act voided all local government

N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 29.
Id.
62
N.D. CENT. CODE § 42-04-02 (2015).
63
Id.
64
§ 42-04-03.
60
61
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ordinances that allowed nuisance suits against farms (unless the
ordinances met the above exceptions).65
Nearly 35 years after the statute’s enactment, only a handful of
reported cases have interpreted North Dakota’s right-to-farm act.66 One
court held the act’s plain language created an exception and allowed
nuisance suits against farmers who negligently or improperly operated
their farms.67 Another court held the act’s “agricultural operation”
definition included corporations involved in preparing or marketing
agricultural products.68
Similarly, Missouri’s right-to-farm amendment provides that the
“right of farmers and ranchers to engage in farming and ranching practices
shall be forever guaranteed in this state . . . .”69 Missouri’s amendment
specifically protects “agriculture which provides food, energy, health

§ 42-04-04.
Based on the number of citations to N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 42-04-01, 42-04-05 (2015).
Only five North Dakota cases have referenced the right-to-farm act; see Jerry Harmon
Motors, Inc. v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass’n, 337 N.W.2d 427, 429 (N.D. 1983);
Knoff v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 380 N.W.2d 313, 315-16 (N.D. 1986); Hebron Pub. Sch.
Dist. No. 13 of Morton Cty. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 475 N.W.2d 120, 126 (N.D. 1991);
State v. Hafner, 587 N.W.2d 177, 183 (N.D. 1998); Tibert v. Slominski, 692 NW.2d 133,
136-37 (N.D. 2005).
67
Hafner, 587 N.W.2d at 183.
68
Tibert, 692 N.W.2d at 136-37.
69
MO. CONST. art. I, § 35.
65
66
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benefits, and security” because such agriculture is “the foundation and
stabilizing force of Missouri’s economy.”70 Missouri’s amendment does
not include any specific exceptions.71
Missouri’s earlier right-to-farm act, enacted in 1982 and amended
in 1990, provides that “[n]o agricultural operation . . . shall be deemed to
be a nuisance, private or public, by any changed conditions in the locality
thereof after the facility has been in operation for more than one year,
when the facility was not a nuisance at the time the operation began.”72
Missouri’s act contained several exceptions, including a requirement that
farming practices comply with “all county, state, and federal
environmental codes, laws, or regulations” in order to be protected by the
act.73 Another exception protected reasonable farm expansion “provided
the expansion does not create a substantially adverse effect upon the
environment or creat[e] a hazard to public health and safety, or creat[e] a
measurably significant difference in environmental pressures upon

Id.
Id.
72
MO. REV. STAT. § 537.295(1) (2000).
73
Id.
70
71
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existing and surrounding neighbors because of increased pollution.”74 A
specific exception for farms with poultry or livestock required that “waste
handling

capabilities

and

facilities

meet

or

exceed

minimum

recommendations of the University of Missouri extension service for
storage, processing, or removal of animal waste” in order for the farm to
fall under the act’s protection.75 Like North Dakota’s act, Missouri’s act
allowed individuals “to recover damages for any injuries sustained . . . as a
result of the pollution or other change in the quantity or quality of water
used . . . or as a result of any overflow of land . . . .”76 Finally, the
Missouri act contained an exception for farms “located within the limits of
any city, town or village.”77 Nearly 35 years after the statute’s enactment,
there are no reported cases interpreting Missouri’s right-to-farm act.78
Because

right-to-farm

amendments

are

a

relatively

new

phenomenon, their limitations are still being tested in court. As of 2015,
no reported cases have challenged the North Dakota amendment. In
Id.
Id.
76
§ 537.295(3).
77
§ 537.295(4).
78
Based on the number of citations to MO. REV. STAT. § 537.295 (2015). Only one
Missouri case has referenced the right-to-farm act; see Perryville v. Brewer, 376 S.W. 3d
691 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012).
74
75
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Missouri, one recent lawsuit claimed the right-to-farm amendment
protects citizens’ right to farm marijuana.79 Lisa Loesch was charged with
felony manufacturing or distributing of a controlled substance in 2013
after Missouri authorities found marijuana plants in her basement.80
Loesch’s attorney argued that she was protected by Missouri’s new rightto-farm amendment because the amendment prohibited legislators from
telling farmers what they can and cannot grow.81 The court ultimately
rejected this argument, with the judge reportedly saying only “traditional
farming and ranching” practices were protected by the amendment.82
IV. INSTANT DECISION
The United States District Court for the District of Oregon
ultimately held that Jackson County Ordinance 635 did not violate
Oregon’s Right to Farm Act.83 When interpreting Oregon law, federal
79
Associated Press, Judge: Missouri Right-to-Farm Doesn’t Cover Growing Weed,
KOMU (Sept. 2, 2015), https://www.komu.com/news/judge-missouri-right-to-farmdoesn-t-cover-growing-weed/ (because Missouri trial courts do not publish their opinions,
no case citation is available).
80
Joel Currier, Does Missouri’s ‘Right-to-Farm’ Amendment Mean You Can Grow
Marijuana in Your Basement?, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH(May 5, 2015),
http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/does-missouri-s-right-to-farmamendment-mean-you-can/article_2eeb3cd3-f881-50d2-a6a8-8f65d8575f57.html.
81
Id.
82
Associated Press, supra note 79.
83
Schultz Family Farms LLC v. Jackson Cty., No. 1:14-cv-01975, 2015 WL 3448069, at
*2 (D. Or. May 29, 2015).
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courts ought to interpret the law in the same manner as would the Oregon
state courts.84 In Oregon, statutory interpretation looks to the legislature’s
intent in enacting a statute.85 To determine legislative intent, the court
looks first to the text and context of the statute, second to statements of
statutory policy, third to pertinent legislative history, and last to general
maxims of statutory construction.86 Statutory context includes both the
immediate context within the statute itself and the broader context of other
related statutes.87
Oregon’s Right to Farm Act states local governmental units’
current and future regulations and ordinances that “‘mak[e] a farm practice
a nuisance or trespass . . . [are] invalid with respect to that farm practice
for which no action or claim is allowed’” under other Oregon statutes.88
Other Oregon statutes disallow nuisance and trespass claims for “‘farming
or forest practice(s) on lands zoned for farm or forest’” and “‘farming or
forest practice(s) allowed as a preexisting nonconforming use.’”89 Both of
these statutes create exceptions for “‘damage to commercial agricultural
Id.
Id.
86
Id. at *3.
87
Id.at *2 (quoting State v. Stamper, 197 Or.App. 413, 417–18 (Or. Ct. App. 2005)).
88
Id. at 3 (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 30.935 (2015)).
89
Id. (quoting OR. REV. STAT. §§ 30.936, 30.937 (2015)).
84
85

19

products.’”90 Nuisance and trespass include claims based on “‘use of crop
production substances.’”91
Included within the Act is a statement as to the legislative intent
behind its enactment.92 Part of the intent was to protect farming practices
and prevent urban sprawl from being detrimental to farmland.93 The
Oregon legislature wanted to protect farming practices from new and
unfriendly suburban neighbors.94 One intention was that “‘farming. . .
practices must be protected from legal actions that may be intended to
limit, or have the effect of limiting, farming . . . practices.’”95 The
legislature also said that anyone who lives on or near land zoned for
farming purposes “‘must accept the conditions commonly associated with
living in that particular setting.’”96 Another intent was to limit the ability
of private individuals to sue for and of local governments to declare
certain farming practices nuisances or trespasses; such suits and
declarations “‘must be limited because [they] are inconsistent with land
Id. (quoting OR. REV. STAT. §§ 30.936(2)(a), 30.937(2)(a) (2015)).
Id. (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 30.932 (2015)).
92
Id. at *3-4; codified at OR. REV. STAT. § 30.933 (2015).
93
Id. at *4.
94
Id.
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Id. at *3 (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 30.933(2)(d) (2015)).
96
Id. at *4 (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 30.033(2)(c) (2015)).
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use policies . . . and have adverse effects on the continuation of farming . .
. practices.’”97
Based on these intentions, the court said the purpose of the Act
was to “protect farms and farming practices from urban encroachment.”98
Essentially, the court said urban and suburban sprawl create the so-called
nuisance; when the farms were there first, the farms win.99
The Act also included an exception the court found persuasive.100
The exception allowed private suits and local government ordinances
prohibiting farming practices that “cause ‘damage to commercial
agriculture.’”101 Not all farming practices are protected – only those that
are most likely to cause tension with non-farming neighbors are within the
purview of the Act.102 Because of this commercial agricultural damage
exception, the court said the Act did not give farmers free reign to use any
and all farming practices they desired.103

Id. (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 30.933(2)(d) (2015)).
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id.
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Id. (quoting OR. REV. STAT. §§ 30.936(2)(a), 30.937(2)(a) (2015)).
102
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Jackson County Ordinance 635 makes it illegal for “‘any person or
entity to propagate, cultivate, raise, or grow genetically engineered plants
within Jackson County.’”104 According to the language of the ordinance,
its purpose is to protect local organic farmers whose crops might be
contaminated by genetic drift from genetically engineered crops (such as
genetically engineered seeds or pollen).105 Because this purpose –
protecting organic farmers’ crops from damage caused by other farmers –
fits within the commercial agricultural damage exception to the Oregon
Right to Farm Act, the United States District Court for the District of
Oregon held the ordinance was valid on its face.106
Plaintiffs argue there must be a showing of actionable damage in
order to meet the exception, so because the ordinance is preventative in
nature, it should not qualify.107 The court rejects this argument because the
text and context of the Right to Farm Act do not suggest such a
requirement.108

Id.
Id.
106
Id. at *5.
107
Id.
108
Id. at *4.
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The court also looked to the legislative history behind Senate Bill
863 and determined the bill’s purpose was to prevent local governmental
units from passing laws or ordinances that would make the production or
use of certain types of seeds illegal.109 A portion of the bill stated that
local government could not “‘inhibit or prevent the production or use of
agricultural seed.’”110 However, in an uncodified section of the bill, the
legislature said the bill did not apply to local government ordinances
“‘[p]roposed by initiative petition and, on or before January 21, 2013,
qualified for placement on the ballot in a county; and . . . [a]pproved by
the electors of the county at an election held on May 20, 2014.’”111 This
uncodified exception exactly matches the circumstances surrounding the
passing of Jackson County Ordinance 635.112 The legislative history
contains testimony from Oregon state senators and representatives stating
that Jackson County – the county where Schultz Family Farms is located –
has a unique geography that makes genetic drift a real threat to organic

Id. at *5.
Id. (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 633.738(2) (2015)).
111
Id. (quoting S.B. 863 § 4, 77th Leg. Assemb., 1st Spec. Sess. (Or. 2013)).
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farmers in the area.113 Oregon’s governor at the time, John Kitzhaber, also
testified that the bill’s purpose was to prevent local bans on genetically
modified seeds with the exception of the already-on-the-ballot Ordinance
635.114 Because this exception clearly applied to the ordinance, the bill did
not preempt the ordinance.115
V. COMMENT
Right-to-farm acts are the best way to protect farms and farmers.
Right-to-farm amendments are unnecessary and may even be detrimental.
Right-to-farm acts allow for necessary exceptions; right-to-farm
amendments will likely make such exceptions much harder to come by.
Additionally, there are concerns about who will benefit the most from
such amendments: small, local family farms or large, impersonal factory
“farms.”
Schultz demonstrates the adaptability of right-to-farm acts.116
Oregon’s Right to Farm Act prohibits “[a]ny local government . . .
ordinance . . . that makes a farm practice a nuisance or trespass” and

Id. at *6.
Id.
115
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Id. at *5.
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makes such an ordinance “invalid with respect to that farm practice.”117
However, the Act is not without exception: farming practices that result in
“damage to commercial agricultur[e]” are not protected by the Act.118 In
Schultz, this exception allowed for a legislative carve-out in a bill that
would have otherwise prevented local governments from regulating the
types of seeds that farmers could and could not use.119 This carve-out –
made possible by the expansive nature of the Act – gave local
governments in Oregon the flexibility to protect organic farmers from
cross-contamination by genetically modified seeds.120 Because the organic
farms were commercial agricultural operations, the Act’s exception
protected them from the harmful practices of other farmers.
Exceptions to constitutional amendments are much harder to come
by. For the most part, states cannot legislate their way around
constitutional amendments; when an amendment clashes with an act, the
amendment generally wins. Schultz demonstrates the necessity of certain
exceptions to right-to-farm acts. Jackson County is home to two groups of
OR. REV. STAT. § 30.935 (2015).
§§ 30.936(2)(a), 30.937(2)(a).
119
Schultz, 2015 WL 3448069 at *5-6; see also OR. REV. STAT. § 637.738(2) (2015) and
S.B. 863 § 4, 77th Leg. Assemb., 1st Spec. Sess. (Or. 2013).
120
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farmers: organic farmers and farmers who utilize genetically engineered
(also called genetically modified) seeds.121 Genetically engineered crops
pose a risk, through cross-pollination, to organic farmers.122 The crosspollination of genetically engineered and organic crops would leave
organic farmers unable to receive the necessary certifications from the
U.S. Dept. of Ag. to label their crops as organic.123 Here, the two groups
of farmers utilized competing farming practices, both of which were
otherwise legal.124 Without Jackson County Ordinance 635 and the
Oregon Right to Farm Act exceptions that made it possible, the organic
farmers would have no protection from the danger of cross-pollination
posed by genetically engineered crops.125
One farmer’s rights cannot always be exercised in harmony with
those of a neighboring farmer.126 Legislatures must have the ability to
create exceptions to protect farmers from each other, as well as from urban
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Id. (citing JACKSON CTY., OR., CODE § 635.02(c)).
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U.S. Department of Agriculture, Can GMOs Be Used in Organic Products?, NAT’L
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and suburban sprawl. Further, legislatures need to be able to create other
exceptions as needed by the communities they represent. The Oregon,
North Dakota, and Missouri acts each contain exceptions tailored to the
needs of each state.127 These legislative exceptions are easier to enact
when farming rights are protected by legislative act rather than
constitutional amendment.
Activists have criticized right-to-farm acts because, in addition to
their rigid construction, they primarily benefit large, corporate factory
farms.128 North Dakota’s Right-To-Farm amendment, enacted in 2014,
specifically prohibits the enactment of laws that “abridg[e] the right of
farmers and ranchers to employ agricultural technology, modern livestock
production, and ranching practices.”129 “Agricultural technology” and
“modern livestock production” might seem innocuous. The phrases could
simply protect the right of farmers to use modern tractors and fertility
drugs – but they could easily be read to protect concentrated animal
feeding operations (“CAFO”) and the complex drug regimens necessary to

See §§ 30.936(2), 30.937(2); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 42-04-02-42-04-03 (2015); MO.
REV. STAT. § 537.295(1), (3), (4) (2000).
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keep CAFO livestock healthy. Without judicial interpretation of the new
North Dakota amendment, it is impossible to know exactly what the
amendment protects.130
Similarly, Missouri’s Right-To-Farm amendment states that the
“right of farmers and ranchers to engage in farming and ranching practices
shall be forever guaranteed in this state.”131 The Missouri amendment does
not specify how that right will be guaranteed.132 The amendment is so
vague as to be almost meaningless. What are “farming and ranching
practices”? How exactly will Missouri protect them? Additionally, while
Missouri’s right-to-farm act included at least five exceptions of varying
specificity, Missouri’s right-to-farm amendment does not include any.133
Is there no longer a need for the exceptions listed in the act? While it is
possible that the amendment will be interpreted using Missouri’s right-tofarm statute as a guideline, without judicial interpretation – which could

As of this writing, no reported cases have even cited to N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 29, let
alone interpreted it.
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take years – it is nearly impossible to determine what effects the
amendment will actually have on Missouri farmers.134
One of the only right-to-farm amendment test cases to date has
been the Loesch marijuana cultivation case.135 A Missouri trial court said
the amendment did not apply and dismissed Loesch’s case.136 Missouri’s
right-to-farm amendment refers to “agriculture which provides food,
energy, health benefits, and security” and, as Missouri allows only
extremely limited medical marijuana use, none of those applied to
Loesch’s crop.137
Oregon will likely have to address a similar issue and decide
whether medical and recreational marijuana – both legal in the state – are
protected by the Right to Farm Act.138 In Jackson County, where Schultz
upheld the ordinance aimed at protecting organic farmers from crop
damage, many residents have complained about the smell associated with

See MO. REV. STAT. § 537.295 (2000).
Associated Press, supra note 79; based on the number of citations to MO. CONST. art.
I, § 35 (only one reported case has cited to the amendment, and it dealt with the propriety
of the ballot language prior to the amendment’s passing).
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marijuana growing operations.139 However, “odors” are included in the
Oregon Right to Farm Act’s definition of prohibited nuisance claims.140
Another Oregon county has considered using zoning laws to prevent
marijuana from being grown on land zoned for agricultural use.141 If
marijuana production is protected under the Act, such zoning laws would
likely run afoul of the Act’s prohibition on local ordinances that make
farming practices nuisances.142
When many people hear the word “farm,” they picture an idyllic
red barn, a yard full of cows, pigs, and chickens, maybe a garden full of
multi-colored vegetables – in short, a family farm straight out of the Old
MacDonald nursery rhyme.143 However, right-to-farm amendments protect
all farms, not just the quaint ones.144 Opponents of right-to-farm
amendments

worry

that

the

amendments

could

interfere

with
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environmental and animal welfare regulations, which mostly affect large
factory farms.145 The possibility that right-to-farm amendments like North
Dakota and Missouri’s might protect CAFOs is troubling. CAFOs may
pose health hazards to humans, animals, and the environment.146 With
such dangerous potential, laws should equip the state government to put in
place regulations to protect health, not prevent it from doing so.
Further, right-to-farm amendments are simply unnecessary. As
shown in Schultz, right-to-farm acts are fully capable of protecting
farmers’ rights.147 Oregon, North Dakota, and Missouri’s right-to-farm
acts allow for state-specific protections and exceptions.148 The two rightto-farm amendments that have been enacted as of 2015 – in North Dakota
and Missouri – are vague when compared to those same state’s prior right-
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to-farm acts.149 The amendments provide farmers with more confusion
than protection.
Few reported cases deal with right-to-farm laws. Only seven
reported cases, including Schultz, cite to the relevant provisions of
Oregon’s Right to Farm Act.150 In North Dakota, only five reported cases
include citations to the relevant provisions of the right-to-farm act;151 zero
reported cases include citations to the right-to-farm amendment.152 In
Missouri, only one reported cases includes citations to the right-to-farm
act;153 only one reported case includes citations to the right-to-farm

See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 42-04-01-42-04-05 (2015); N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 29; MO.
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amendment.154 If the right-to-farm acts were barely used and rarely
litigated, why bother creating more expansive right-to-farm amendments?
Right-to-farm amendments are unnecessary, overly broad, and do
not allow for necessary exceptions. Right-to-farm acts are more detailed
and easier to adapt to the needs of a specific state. Although few farmers
appear to have taken advantage of either, right-to-farm acts are superior to
right-to-farm amendments in protecting farms and farmers.
VI. CONCLUSION
Schultz Family Farms, LLC v. Jackson City shows the necessity of
legislative exceptions to right-to-farm laws. As demonstrated in Schultz,
Oregon’s Right to Farm Act made such an exception easy. The Act
included a specific rationale for creating the Schultz exception; this
rationale is also likely to work for other, similar exceptions that become
necessary in the future. State right-to-farm acts have been around for
decades, but the recent trend toward adding right-to-farm amendments to
state constitutions will make it harder to create necessary exceptions.

Shoemyer v. Mo. Sec. of State, 464 S.W.3d 171 (Mo. 2015) (did not interpret MO.
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dismissed marijuana grower’s claim that she fell under the amendment’s protection).
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Additionally, right-to-farm amendments might protect large farmers at the
expense of the small family farmers who helped make America what it is
today. Because right-to-farm acts have worked so well for so long, states
should not enact stricter, harder-to-adapt right-to-farm amendments.
JENNIFER BENNETT
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